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That sugar occupies a cherished role in the human diet hardly needs men-
tion. After all, nearly 2,500 tastebuds located at the tip of the human tongue
are dedicated to the pursuit of sweetness. The rst recorded mention of sugar, a
description of a crown of glistening sugar crystals, dates back to a sacred Hindu
text from 800 B.C.1 Of course, the sumptuous deserts and candies which fulll
our sugar cravings come at a high caloric cost, a cost which has become less and
less aordable to the growing millions who seek to watch their weight. As far
back as the mid 1800's, people recognized the tension between the desire to eat
delicious foods, and the often contravening desire to eat healthfully. \The plea-
sures of the appetite are legitimate pleasures," wrote Mrs. Horace Mann, but
\God did not implant the sense of Taste in man to ruin the beautiful structure
of his body, or to impair the noble faculties of his soul."2 It is not surprising,
therefore, that the intersection of the dietary movement with the human sweet
tooth would eventually lead to a demand for low calorie articial sweeteners.
Unfortunately for dieters and diabetics alike, the two sweeteners which
preceded aspartame to the market each were found to present health risks. Faced
with evidence of possible carcinogenicity, FDA banned cyclamate in 1969.3 Sac-
charin was the next sweetener to come under FDA re. Implicated by two 1972
1Diane Ackerman, A Natural History of the Senses, Vintage Books, 1990, p. 135. The
Hindu text is the Atharvaveda.
2The Culinary Historians of Boston Newsletter, Volume XVII, Number 3, January, 1997,
p.10.
3See 34 FR 17063. In 1985, FDA's Cancer Assessment Committee held that cyclamate
itself is not carcinogenic; however, the National Academy of Sciences concluded that it may
contribute to the production of tumors: See Peter Barton Hutt, Richard A. Merrill, Food and
Drug Law: Cases and Materials, Foundation Press, 1991, p. 923.
1animal studies, saccharin nally faced an FDA ban in 1977, after a third ani-
mal study completed in Canada indicated \unequivocally that saccharin causes
bladder tumors in the test animals."4 Unwilling to wrest the only remaining
sugar alternative away from the American consumer, Congress passed the Sac-
charin Study and Labeling Act, which imposed a moratorium on the saccharin
ban, recently extended until May 1997, and required that the risks of cancer
be clearly labeled on saccharin products.5 So, with one sweetener ominously
labeled and another banned outright, American consumers were hungry for a
new, safer articial sweetener.
A food additive petition landed on the Food and Drug Administra-
tion's desk on February 9, 1973 that seemed to oer an answer to America's
culinary prayers. Illinois company G.D. Searle sought approval for an odorless,
white crystalline powder, composed of two amino acids, L-aspartic acid and L-
phenylalanine, which oered all the sweetness of sugar at a fraction of the caloric
price6. While not quite as sweet as saccharin, aspartame could boast that it
lacked its competitor's bitter after-taste. More importantly, Searle planned to
market aspartame as a safer choice than saccharin, which, as mentioned, was
not yet subject to the Congressional labeling regulation but was already clouded
by accusations of carcinogenicity. The road to aspartame's approval, however,
would be long and arduous, engendering scientic, legal and ethical disputes
442 FR 19996, April 15, 1977. FDA explains that if everyone in the United States consumed
one saccharin-sweetened beverage once a day over a lifetime, there would be between zero and
1,200 additional cases of bladder cancer a year, i.e. the risk for an individual consumer would
be between zero and four in 10,000.
5The warning label, which is scripted even more nely than this footnote, reads: \Use of
this product may be hazardous to your health. This product contains saccharin, which has
been determined to cause cancer in laboratory animals."
638 FR 5921, March 5, 1973
2that continue to resonate fteen years later. In FDA's approval of aspartame,
and in its continued support of the product today, there emerges a recurring
question: how much scientic evidence is enough to invoke the regulatory pow-
ers of the agency against a popular and much desired substance?
Despite the din of controversy surrounding the introduction and pro-
liferation of aspartame in the American marketplace, its discovery occurred
without fanfare, and quite by accident. In 1965, while testing a new anti-ulcer
drug at the G.D. Searle Company, chemist James Schlatter created an interme-
diate chemical {aspartylphenylalanine-methyl-ester (aspartame)- and spilled a
little of the powder on the outside of the test tube. Licking his nger later in the
day to pick up a piece of paper, he noticed an intensely sweet taste and realized
it was the aspartame powder.7 Soon after, Searle began studying aspartame for
use as an articial sweetener. Searle announced its discovery in the publication
Science in 19708, and entered into discussions with the Food and Drug Admin-
istration, culminating in the 1973 petition for approval of aspartame for use in
all foods.
In 1981, Searle nally gained approval for the additive for use in dry
foods. In 1983, the FDA approved Searle's petition for use in carbonated bever-
ages, which would exponentially increase aspartame consumption in the United
States and abroad. A few months later, a third petition was granted for use of
aspartame as an inactive ingredient in human drug products.9 Finally, on June
7Stegink, Lewis D., Filer L., 1984. \Aspartame: Physiology and Biochemistry," Marcel
Dekker, Inc., N.Y., p. 4.
8\Aspartylphenylalanine methyl ester: a low calorie sweetener," Science, Volume 170, p.
81.
9See for 48 FR 31376 for approval in carbonated drinks and see 48 FR 54993 for approval
328, 1996, the Food and Drug Administration amended the food additive regu-
lations to allow the use of aspartame as a general sweetener, thereby collapsing
most of the twenty-three previously designated uses into a single use category
for food.10 Well over 100 million people consumer aspartame-sweetened prod-
ucts today, a popularity which translates into over a billion dollars a year for
the industry. Monsanto, which bought G.D. Searle in 1985 and created the
NutraSweet Kelco Company as a subsidiary11, is currently testing aspartame in
China, the world's largest market.12
Despite aspartame's ultimate success in entering the food supply, few
products in FDA history have generated such controversy. While the FDA and
Monsanto stand rmly by the sweetener, a number of consumer groups, promi-
nent scientists, and political leaders have raised scientic and ethical concerns
about FDA's decision to approve the sweetener. First, they argue that the
old studies upon which FDA approval rested were awed and that new studies
are needed to address aspartame's relationship to brain tumors and a range of
other purported side-eects. Second, aspartame opponents contend that polit-
ical considerations, particularly the \revolving door" between the public and
private food and drug sectors, fueled the FDA approval of what they perceive
to be an unsafe additive.
Accusations that aspartame endangers the public health vary in tenor
as inactive ingredient in drugs.
10Amendment of x 172.804 (21 CFR 172.804), as announced in 61 FR 33654, June 28, 1996.
11According to Steve Wilson's I984 interview with Robert Shapiro, head of Searle's Nu-
traSweet Group, sale of aspartame products yielded 70% of Searle's annual prots before it
sold out to Monsanto. \Sweet Suspicions," a Steve Wilson report included in the Congres-
sional Record, Senate Proceedings and Debates of the 99th Congress, First Session, August
1, 1985.
12Transcript of CBS 60 Minutes, \How Sweet Is It?", December 29, 1996, p. 8.
4and credibility13. Some consumers have organized to form aspartame aware-
ness groups and have even established WebSites on the Internet. One site goes
so far as to label aspartame a \chemical weapon" and instructs consumers to
\think of aspartame as the drug-equivalent of AIDS!"14 Another WebSite lists
a plethora of aspartame-induced symptoms, ranging from dizziness, memory
loss, personality changes, impotency, and hair-loss, to death. The site also cau-
tions that \aspartame disease mimics symptoms" or exacerbates a number of
diseases, such as arthritis, Lupus, Alzheimer's, Lyme disease, and depression.15
Mary Nash Stoddard, former judge on the State of Texas Board of Adjust-
ments, board member of the National Natural Foods Association, and founder
of the Aspartame Consumer Safety Network, agrees that aspartame may both
cause individual symptoms and eect sets of symptoms that resemble diseases,
such as chronic fatigue syndrome. Contending that the FDA and aspartame
manufacturers are deliberately keeping the public in the dark about the health
hazards, she remarks: \aspartame approval and persistence on the market has
everything to do with money and politics, and almost nothing to do with science
and reason."16
FDA has, in fact, received over 7,000 complaints from consumers re-
13In a modern version of the Boston Tea Party, a group of activists, joined by Emory Law
School professor David Bederman, dumped an unsavory mixture of Diet Coke, NutraSweet,
and rBGH-enhanced milk all over the sidewalk in Atlanta, Georgia on August 17, 1995. The
group was protesting both the use of aspartame and BGH in foods and the \food slander" laws,
on the books in Georgia and ten other states, which make it a civil crime to criticize or deni-
grate food without a \scientic basis." The protesters argue that these laws are the handiwork
of the food industry lobby and are calculated to keep consumers \cowed." (Gar Smith, \Food
Slander is Now a Crime," ELJ Fall 95, downloaded from http://www.igc.apc.org/ei/journal/
slander.html
14See http://www.dorway.com/nuindex1.html/menu on, copyright 1996, David O. Reitz,
the Internet. I was informed that I was the 5379th visitor to the site.
15See http://www.tiac.net/users/mgold/aspartame/aspartame.html.
16Nutrition and Healing, November, 1995, interview with Mary Nash Stoddard, p.4.
5porting adverse reactions to aspartame, including dizziness, headaches, and
seizures.17 Dr. Richard Wurtman, a scientist at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, is worried about potential adverse eects of aspartame on some
consumers. After voicing concerns about the sweetener in the mainstream me-
dia in 1984, he became inundated with letters from individuals claiming to have
experienced unpleasant symptoms which they attributed to the aspartame in
their diets. These complaints, similar to the complaints received by the FDA
and by Searle itself, described numbness, insomnia, rashes, menstrual problems,
nausea, and headaches.18 A number of those reporting symptoms insisted that
they had conrmed their reactions by cutting aspartame out of their diets for
a time to see if the symptoms vanished, then starting up again to see if they
would return.
The Annals of Internal Medicine reported a severe example of allergic
reaction to aspartame in 1985. In \the rst conrmed case of aspartame-induced
granulomatous panniculitis19," Dr. Nelson Lee Novick described a healthy 22
year-old female who developed \numerous, bilateral, nontender nodular lesions"
on both of her legs lasting approximately two months. The patient, who insisted
she had neither used any medications in the previous six months nor had suf-
fered any recent trauma or infection, stated that she had consumed between
17\How Sweet Is It?", p.2. Aspartame complaints account for up to 75% of all FDA con-
sumer complaints annually, according to Stoddard, above, and Nexus Magazine, \The Bitter
Truth about Articial Sweeteners," Volume 2, p.28 (Oct.-Nov., 1995)
18Common Cause Magazine: \How Safe is Your Diet Soft Drink?", July/August 1984,
included in the Congressional Record, Senate Proceedings and Debates of the 99th Congress,
First Session, May 7, 1985, p.50. Copies of complaints to the FDA and Searle obtained by
Common Cause under the Freedom of Information Act.
19Annals of Internal Medicine, \Aspartame-Induced Granulomatous Panniculitis," Vol.
102, No.2, February 1985, included in the Congressional record, May, 1985, p.21.
636 and 44 uid oz. of soft drink sweetened with saccharin nearly every day for
the past six years. Ten weeks before presenting herself for medical evaluation,
she had switched from her former diet soda to the same manufacturer's new
aspartame-sweetened soda. Her diet had otherwise not changed.
Two weeks after switching sweeteners, the patient noticed deep nod-
ules on her left thigh which proceeded to enlarge and spread on both legs. After
her rst medical examination, she was advised to stop consuming aspartame
for four weeks, and the lesions disappeared. She was then instructed to re-
sume drinking the aspartame-sweetened beverages, and her lesions reappeared
within ten days. Again she refrained from aspartame, and again her lesions
vanished. To further test the hypothesis that aspartame had caused the phe-
nomenon, she was next administered 50 mg capsules of aspartame, supplied by
Searle, four times a day. In ten days, she again suered from an outbreak of
the nontender nodules all over her legs. The lesions cleared up after cessation
of the doses. Having studied the patient's blood test results and other constitu-
tional symptoms, Novick ruled out a number of non-aspartame causes. While
not concluding with certainly that aspartame was the culprit, he states, \the
formation of toxic metabolites of aspartame, either during the drug's shelf-life
or as metabolic byproducts, oers one possible explanation for the reaction seen
in this patient." He also notes that Searle had previously received numerous
unconrmed reports of \dermal eruptions" by consumers of aspartame.
Aspartame critics also claim that aspartame can induce seizures in non-
epileptics and lower seizure thresholds for epileptics. M.I.T.'s Dr. Wurtman,
7who has studied 80 individuals who had seizures after consuming aspartame, is
concerned about a potential causal link. Wurtman, who testied on behalf of
the aspartame industry in the early 1980's and who admits to dusting his straw-
berries with Equal, argues that uncertainties still hover around the sweetener.20
He does not argue for a ban, but urges that placebo-controlled studies be initi-
ated to determine aspartame's relationship to seizures, as well as to a range of
other adverse reactions.21 But the Epilepsy Foundation of America defends the
sweetener, as do the American Medical Association, the United Kingdom Com-
mittee on Toxicology of Chemicals in Foods, the Scientic Committee for Food
of the European Economic Communities, and the Canadian Health Protection
Branch. Those organizations \have all armed the safety of aspartame for the
general population."22
Those who stand by aspartame's safety record say that the age-old
\placebo eect" among consumers, coupled by wide-scale media focus on the
product, means that the new kid on the block gets blamed for every ailment
that comes along. Former Searle executive attorney Robert Shapiro explains:
\I believe if we were to introduce lettuce to the market tomorrow with a big
national publicity campaign, and nobody had ever seen lettuce before, and peo-
ple started eating lettuce, my guess is you would get exactly the same kinds of
complaints."23 Another explanation oered for the complaints is the sheer fact
20Common Cause, p. 40. x
21Letter from Dr. Richard Wurtman to Senator Howard Metzenbaum, April 22, 1985,
included in the Congressional Record, May, 1985.
22Reina Berner, Dr. Richard Reuben, The Epilepsy Institute, in a letter to the Washington
Post, April 30, 1986, reprinted at the Honorable Tony Coehlo's urging in the Congressional
record, June 20, 1986. Coelho remarks, \as one who has epilepsy, I would like to dispel the
unnecessary concern about aspartame..."
23Congressional record, May, 1985, p.51.
8that out of over 100 million aspartame users worldwide24 there are bound to be
those who are allergic, just as there are those who are allergic to dairy products
or peanuts. Dr. Gerald E. Gaull, former vice president for nutrition and medical
aairs for aspartame at Searle conceded that \a few people may be...sensitive
to it...For those few people, the issue is not one of safety but rather of food
selection."25 Critics of aspartame, however, continue to lobby for additional
testing and assert that both the FDA and the industry are underestimating the
severity and the prevalence of consumer \sensitivities."
Looming even more largely than accusations that aspartame induces
incidentalized adverse reactions are suspicions that aspartame causes brain tu-
mors in laboratory rats, and may cause brain tumors in human beings. The
most recent claim hails from long-time aspartame critic, Dr. John Olney, a neu-
ropathologist and psychiatrist at Washington University's School of Medicine.
Olney and a team of Washington University researchers recently examined brain
tumor data gathered by the National Cancer Institute and published an analysis
which has generated great controversy among physicians and scientists.26 They
report that three to ve years after aspartame was approved, the incidence of
brain tumors rose by 10%, translating into approximately 1,500 additional cases
a year. The team also points out that there has been a distinct change in the
specic kinds of tumors reported over this time period. In particular, there has
been a decrease in the more benign, preliminary tumors, astrocytomas and a
24Minneapolis -St. Paul Star -Tribune, \NutraSweet Is Suspected in Rise in Brain Tumors,"
November 5, 1996.
25Science Times, \Sweetener Worries Some Scientists," February 5, 1985.
26Study published in the Journal of Neuropathology and Experimental Neurology, Vol.55,
No.11, November 1996.
9concurrent marked increase in the more aggressive and deadly glioblastomas.
While not claming certainty that aspartame is responsible for this rise in brain
cancer, Olney and his colleagues believe it is the most likely candidate and argue
for more aspartame research. Leading epidemiologist Dr. Debra Davis of the
Strang-Cornell Cancer Prevention Center agrees that \without any question"
brain cancer is on the rise in industrialized countries. She also believes that,
while there could be a spectrum of environmental factors at work, \one of them
may be, for some people, increased consumption of aspartame."27
The FDA and the aspartame industry insist that the rise in brain can-
cer has nothing to do with consumption of the articial sweetener. According
to Deputy Commissioner David Friedman , the Olney hypothesis is simply \not
a convincing line of evidence."28 FDA released the following position statement
oering a dierent interpretation of the brain tumor data, contending that the
National Cancer Institute's statistics \show that overall incidence of brain and
central nervous system cancers began increasing in 1973 and continued to in-
crease through 1985 in the United States. Since 1985 the trend line has attened
for these cancers, and in the last two years recorded (1991 to 1993), the incidence
has slightly decreased."29 Virginia Weldon, head of public policy at Monsanto,
also dismisses the Olney paper, remarking that \even the most respected and
distinguished investigators occasionally make mistakes, and in this instance, I
think Dr. Olney has made a mistake."30
27\How Sweet Is It?", p. 2.
28FDA Week, January 3, 1997, p. 5.
29Id, at 6.
30\How Sweet Is It?", p.7.
10Other critics of Olney's research suggest that advances in diagnostic
technology mean that doctors are simply detecting more tumors today than
they used to, which may account for much of the 10% increase. But Olney
responds that computerized tomography was used in the early to middle 1970's
and magnetic resonance imaging technology became widely used in the early
eighties, the impact of which on tumor detection had already been felt by the
time aspartame entered the equation. Moreover, he argues, if diusion of ad-
vanced diagnostic systems were the explanation, one would expect to see a rise
in the smaller, preliminary astrocytomas which the newer technology now better
detects.31 Yet it is the incidence of the larger, more readily detectable glioblas-
tomas that has risen so sharply in the years after the introduction of aspartame
into the American marketplace. Finally, Dr. Olney contends that these are the
same types of tumors that were found in laboratory rats in one of the contro-
versial toxicity studies done on aspartame in the 1970's.
Does Olney want the FDA to impose an immediate ban on the sus-
picious sweet powder? \No," he explains, \and I'm not saying that aspartame
has been proven to cause brain tumors. I'm saying that there is enough basis to
suspect aspartame, that it needs to be reassessed. The FDA needs to reassess
it, and this time around, FDA should do it right."32
Dr. Olney and other aspartame critics believe that the FDA did not properly
assess the safety of aspartame \the rst time around," when Searle rst applied
31\Increasing Brain Tumor Rates: Is There a Link to Aspartame?", by Dr. Erik Mill-
stone, Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, October 1996. Report is posted on
http://web2.airmail.net/marystod/cancer.htm, p. 2.
32\How Sweet Is It?", p.3.
11for approval back in 1973. They argue that Commissioner Hays' decision to
allow the sweetener into the homes and stomachs of consumers was both ir-
responsible and, indeed, a violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act.33 Dr. Virginia Weldon of Monsanto, on the other hand, insists that \aspar-
tame is one of the safest food ingredients ever approved by the Food and Drug
Administration," a sentiment which FDA itself has echoed time and again.
When Searle initially applied for FDA approval in 1974, it submitted
general information about aspartame's chemical composition and specications
along with summaries of 119 human and animal studies, in accordance with
the broad guidelines then in eect for food additives.34 Proposed uses included
sweetening dry beverage mixes, gelatins, llings, puddings, breakfast cereals,
chewing gum, and soft drinks, as well as use as a free-owing table sweetener.
Searle amended the petition a month later to ask permission to include the
water-soluble lubricant L-leucine in production of aspartame tablets. Without
the help of L-leucine, which is a \generally recognized as safe" 35 substance, an
unattractive lm appeared on the surface of hot beverages in which aspartame
was dissolved.
In making a determination of the safety of a proposed food additive,
3321 U.S.C. 301, hereafter refereed to as the FD&C Act.
34The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not indicate with any specicity the kinds of kind
of scientic evidence required to prove the safety of a food additive. The FDA followed broad
guidelines written by outside scientists until 1977, when FDA's Bureau of Foods (now called
the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition) published a memo of its own specifying
what kinds of studies were required. In 1982, the Bureau published the \Red Book," which
formally outlined the agency's standards and criteria for safety studies for food additives. A
1987 Report by the General Accounting Oce found that the requirements for in eect when
aspartame underwent evaluation were substantially similar to those late formalized by the
Bureau.
3521 C.F.R. 121.101; 21 C.F.R. 121.1002
12such as a sweetener, the 1958 Food Additives Amendment requires the FDA to
consider the following factors36:
a) the probable consumption of the additive and of any substance
formed in or on food because of the use of the additive;
b) the cumulative eect of such additive in the diet of man or ani-
mals, taking into account any chemically or pharmacologically related
substance or substance in the diet; and
c) safety factors which in the opinion of experts qualied by scientic
training and experience to evaluate the safety of food additives are
generally recognized as appropriate for the use of animal experimentation
data.
No additive will be deemed safe for consumption if the evidence \fails to
establish that the proposed use of the food additive...will be safe" or if the
additive is determined to cause cancer \when ingested by man or animal."37
Having examined the studies and indications submitted by Searle, the
FDA instructed them in September, 1973 that it would have to withdraw its
petition unless the company could assuage certain concerns, namely38:
1. the potential of aspartame to combine with nitrates in the stomach
to form carcinogens (nitrosation);
2. the adequacy of evidence to evaluate the signicance of certain
pathological ndings, such as brain tumors, and liver and
3621 U.S.C. 348(c)(5)
3721 U.S.C. 348 (c)(3)(A)
38Report from the Comptroller General of the United States: Regulation of the Food Addi-
tive Aspartame, April 8, 1976, p.4.
13kidney changes observed in some test animals;
3. the signicance of the increased incidence of hyperplasia (abnormal
rise in the number of cells in a tissue) in mice administered aspartame
and the signicance of tumors noted in the urinary bladders of mice;
4. and, the suciency of data to determine the long-term eect of
diketopiperazine (DKP), a byproduct of aspartame and a breakdown
product occurring during prolonged storage or cooking.
The following January, Searle submitted additional studies and data address-
ing the aforementioned concerns. According to FDA's Division of Toxicology,
the new evidence indicated that fears of nitrosation were unwarranted, that
brain and kidney changes did not appear to be caused by exposure to aspar-
tame, and that liver nodules found on some test animals were not statistically
signicant. Also, Searle's additional tests suggested that there was no causal
link between bladder tumors and aspartame.
Two concerns nevertheless remained. First, the DKP which material-
ized as a breakdown product when aspartame is exposed to pronged heat posed
uncertain health risks, as well as neutralized the sweet avor. Second, the amino
acid L-phenylalanine posed potential danger to a sub-group of the population
suering from a genetic metabolic disorder, phenylketonuria. Weighing the ev-
idence before it, FDA issued a regulation in July, 1974, approving aspartame
for use in certain foods and under certain labeling conditions. Searle would
be permitted to market aspartame for use in cold breakfast cereals, chewing
14gum, dry beverages and mixes, imitation whipped cream, as a chewing gum
avor-enhancer, and as a dry, free-owing sweetener \in units not to exceed
the sweetening equivalent of two teaspoonsful of sugar."39 To address lingering
concerns about the product, FDA issued the following labeling requirements:
First, aspartame of the free-owing variety must indicate that it is not for use
in cooking or baking. Second, any product containing aspartame must bear the
warning: \PHENYLKETONURICS: CONTAINS PHENYLALANINE.40"
And so, with an excitement matched only by the anticipation of waist
watchers and diabetics across the country, G.D. Searle prepared to introduce
its delicious, safe sweetener into the American food supply.
Meanwhile, a small group of private individuals began to draft ob-
jections against the approval of aspartame, pursuant to x 348(f)(1) of the Act
which provides that any person \adversely aected" by a food additive regula-
tion may le objections within 30 days of the regulation's publication requesting
a public hearing. If the FDA deems such objections reasonable, it must convene
a public hearing \as promptly as possible." Objections were led in August by
Dr. John Olney and, jointly, by Washington attorney and former associate of
Ralph Nader, James Turner, and the Washington consumer group Legal Action
for Buyers' Education and Labeling, Inc. (LABEL, Inc.).41 Olney. Turner, and
39Id., at 6.
40Aspartame was also required to be labeled in accordance with FDA's dietary foods regu-
lations, 21 C.F.R. 105.
41A third petition was led by the Quaker Oats Company, which did not request a hearing
but requested that its cereal boxes be permitted to omit the warning to phenylketonurics, on
the grounds that amount of phenylalanine naturally occurring in their cereals was three times
greater than would be contributed by the addition of aspartame. Therefore, they argued, the
labeling would be \unnecessary and redundant." FDA refused to grant the labeling exemption.
See Comptroller General Report, 1976, p.9.
15LABEL requested a hearing about aspartame's toxicity, especially in regard to
infants and children. Olney also worried that the consumption of aspartame
with monosodium glutamate might induce brain damage.42 After negotiations
with FDA, in November of 1975, the three opponents to waive their right to
an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge (which in 1975 would
have been at least a six month wait) and to allow a Public Board of Inquiry
(PBOI) to evaluate the scientic evidence.43
It would be nearly ve years, however, before the PBOI at last con-
vened to adjudicate the safety of aspartame. Suspicions that Searle was guilty
of laboratory misconduct and fraudulent data reporting with respect to two
other products, the hypertension drug aldactone and the anti-infection drug
agyl, side-tracked FDA ocials. In July of 1975, Commissioner Dr. Alexander
Schmidt appointed a Searle Investigation Task Force to review the integrity of
the manufacturer's studies. Though primarily focused on data from six drugs
dating back to 1968, including agyl and aldactone, the Task Force included
aspartame studies as well because \1) of the additive's recent approval, 2) of
it's potential for wide use in foods, and 3) its inclusion would provide a broader
42Olney had been a vocal critic of the FDA's approval of monosodium glutamate. See J.
Verrett, J. Carper, Eating May Be Hazardous to Your Health, 1974, p.88-97.
43The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act provides that an evidentiary hearing be held when
there is controversy about the safety of a proposed food additive (21 U.S.C. 348(f)), an
adjudication pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. xx551-559, 701-706
(1982)). But the Commissioner may instead convene a Public Board of Inquiry when it \in
the public interest" (21 C.F.R. xx13.1-.50(1985)). Many prefer the PBOI model of a roundtable
of independent scientists analyzing data to the more adversarial administrative adjudications.
Peter Barton Hutt, former Chief Counsel to the FDA, oers the following evaluation of the
administrative hearing: \it has, of course, done one thing. It has employed hundreds of lawyers
involved in these proceedings. But instead of advancing the scientic issue or the regulatory
issue...I would argue that it has set us back." (Hutt, Impact of Recent Court Decisions on
the Future of FDA Regulations: An Impromptu Response to the Remarks of the Speakers,
28 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law Journal, 707, 714 (1973))
16product base to evaluate Searle's practices."44 Schmidt charged the investiga-
tory body to:
1) review the practices followed by Searle in conducting animal experiments,
analyzing the experimental data, and submitting the data to FDA;
2) determine if there is evidence that any practices of Searle in carrying
out the above functions violated the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act or any other laws of the United States; and
3) recommend an appropriate course of action based on the investigation's
ndings.45
Faced with preliminary ndings that Searle had engaged in dubi-
ous laboratory practice, in December of 1975 the Commissioner decided to stay
approval of aspartame pending the completion of the investigation, pursuant to
x 348(e) of the Act. Meanwhile, having invested an irretrievable $29 million
in its articial sweetener, Searle was forced to pull the plug on production at
its aspartame factory in Augusta, Georgia. The stay, coupled by the negative
media attention, \lowered company morale and badly shook investor condence
in the drug manufacturer."46
The Searle Task Force concluded its investigation in March, 1976,
declaring that \the results were so serious in some studies as to make it dif-
cult, if not impossible, to draw conclusions regarding the full toxic potential of
the products from the data."47 FDA Toxicologist and Task Force member Dr.
44Report of the Comptroller General, 1976, p.13.
45Id., at 12.
46Wall Street Journal, July 21, 1975, p.4, col. 3.
47General Accounting Oce Report, 1987, p. 30.
17Adrian Gross reported that in some of the aspartame studies he reviewed, Searle
\lied and they didn't submit the real nature of their observations because had
they done that it is more than likely that a great number of these studies would
have been rejected...they took great pains to camouage these shortcomings."
For example, reports Gross, the Task Force found some instances of lab tech-
nicians cutting out tumors from live animals before the studies were nished.
He comments that Searle \lter(ed) and just present(ed) to the FDA what they
wished the FDA to know."48
In conclusion, the Task Force identied \serious deciencies in Searle's
operations and practices which undermine the basis for reliance on Searle's in-
tegrity in conducting high-quality animal research to accurately determine or
characterize the toxic potential of its products."49 The Task Force recommended
that: 1) \the Department of Justice institute grand jury proceedings against
Searle; 2) FDA establish regulations outlining good laboratory practice50; and
3) FDA determine whether to take administrative and/or regulatory actions on
each of the Searle products investigated."51
Turning back to the issue of aspartame, FDA now had to decide
whether or not its initial conclusions about the product's safety withstood the
storm. Convening a PBOI, after all, would be a fruitless endeavor if the panel
of scientists had no way of knowing if the studies before them were credible. No
longer willing to trust Searle to authenticate its own data, CFSAN chose fteen
48Wilson, \Sweet Suspicions," Congressional record, August, 1985, p.27.
49Id., p.83.
50On December 22, 1978, FDA did formalize good laboratory practice regulations, setting
standards for scientic animal studies.
51Id., p.30.
18aspartame studies and farmed out twelve to a consortium of nine independent
universities (UAREP) and another three to an FDA team. Although Searle
would pay for UAREP's investigation, a contract between them stipulated that
the researchers work independently of either FDA or Searle inuence.52
Between April and September of 1977, the FDA team undertook a
thorough review of the laboratory procedures, observations, and data of each
of the three studies, examining over 7,800 slides and 7,300 tissue blocks. In
each study, the team identied \quality control problems" in each of the three
studies it audited. For example, the investigators found that in one study the
aspartame may not have been thoroughly distributed in the rat food, thereby
allowing the animals to eat around the powder, a suspicion which was collabo-
rated by photograph found in the notebook of a Searle employee.53 The team
also questioned some dubious claims about how many fetuses were examined in
the two teratology studies. In particular, a report that 329 examinations were
completed in two days by a single technician seemed infeasible. Despite these
and other dubious ndings, the team tentatively accepted the validity of the
studies' results, pending the outcome of the UAREP investigation.
It took UAREP investigators two years to analyze the twelve studies
at issue. They reviewed over 23,000 pages of clinical observations, background
materials, and experimental data, examined 39,000 tissue samples from nearly
5,000 animals, reviewed laboratory protocols, and interviewed former and cur-
rent Searle employees involved in aspartame research. Like the FDA team, and
52Id., p.31.
53Id., p.32.
19the Searle Task Force before it, UAREP located procedural aw in Searle's an-
imal studies; nevertheless, it found no evidence that \animals in any one group
had been treated deliberately to produce biased results." Submitting a 1,062
page report to FDA on December 13, 1978, it concluded that it had identied
no discrepancies \that are of sucient magnitude or of a nature that would
compromise the data as originally submitted by Searle."54 It seemed the long-
awaited aspartame hearing, which would be the rst time FDA would test out
its new PBOI format, could nally go forward.
Before the hearing could begin, however, the parties involved had to
frame the relevant issues to be addressed by the panel. After much negotiation,
they agreed to charge the scientic board with the following three questions:55
1) Whether ingestion of aspartame, either alone or together with the
amino acid glutamate, poses a risk of contributing to mental retar-
dation, brain damage, or undesirable eects on the neuroendocrine
system.
2) Whether ingestion of aspartame may induce brain tumors in rats.
3) Based on answers to the above questions, (a) should aspartame be
allowed for use in foods, or, instead, should approval be withdrawn?
(b) if allowed for use in foods, what conditions of use and labeling
statements (if any) should be required?56
54Id., Appendix IV, p.90.
55Mr. Turner requested that the PBOI review the evidence previously gathered indicating
quality control problems in some of Searle's studies. Both the Commissioner and PBOI denied
his request on the grounds that the integrity of the studies, however shabby, had already been
armed by both the Searle Task Force and UAREP. Moreover, PBOI members explained
their duty was to analyze the evidence, not the conduct of the studies.
5644 FR 31717
20Who then should be entrusted with evaluating these issues?
As mentioned, the purpose of convening a PBOI was to provide a forum where
experts could evaluate scientic evidence and resolve controversies insulated
from political or professional pressures. To best expedite this goal, Acting
Commissioner Sherwin Gardner asked Searle, FDA, and the objecting parties
to each submit a list of ve qualied candidates. After evaluating the nomi-
nees, Gardner selected one scientist from each list to create the following panel:
from CFSAN's list, Walle Nauta, M.D., Ph.D, a neuroanatomist and professor
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who was named chairman; from
the objectors' list, Peter Lambert, M.D., clinical pathologist and chairperson of
the Department of Pathology at the University of California at San Diego; and,
from Searle's list, Vernon Young, Ph.D., a nutritional biochemist and M.I.T.
professor. Olney protested Dr. Young's selection, asserting that, as a nutrition
and metabolism specialist, Young was not properly qualied to assess the neu-
rotoxicity issue.57 Furthermore, objected Olney, Young had written authors in
conjunction with Searle in the past on nonaspartame-related issues and could
therefore not be impartial. His objections, however, were overruled.
For three days the panel heard evidence on all three issues from all
involved parties. Some presenters used slides to illustrate their points and,
while the three board members raised questions throughout, the parties were
not permitted to interrupt one another: \the proceeding resembled a roundtable
discussion. These interchanges were almost always nonconfrontational and non-
57Olney, John W. Letter to Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum, included in the record before
the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, November 3, 1987, regarding
\NutraSweet Health and Safety Concerns," p.468-476.
21adversarial in nature.58" With the exception of Turner, no attorneys partici-
pated in the proceedings. After ten months of deliberation, the board issued
its determinations in October of 1980, which would be nal unless hearing par-
ticipants later raised objections and the Commissioner chose to overrule the
PBOI. First, it concluded that aspartame did not cause brain damage, mental
retardation, or neuroendocrine dysfunction. Much to Searle's dismay, however,
the board recommended that aspartame not be approved for use in foods based
on \scientic data suggestive of aspartame's potential for causing brain tumors
in laboratory rats."59 More studies must be done, it commented, before aspar-
tame's oncogenic tendency can be ruled out. The board vacated the stay of
approval formerly issued and revoked the 1973 regulation which had rst ex-
tended FDA approval.
Not surprisingly, Searle, faced with nancial disaster, immediately led
objections to the PBOI determinations, thereby triggering Commissioner re-
view and the possibility that he would overrule the earlier ndings. Losing
money with every passing hour, Searle also led a lawsuit against the FDA in
an attempt to hasten the Commissioner's review. In March of 1981, then FDA
Commissioner Jere Goyan assembled a panel of ve scientists to review the con-
clusions reached by the PBOI and to evaluate the objections led. One month
later, Ronald Reagan appointed a new Commissioner, Arthur Hull Hayes, Jr.,
to whom befell the unenviable task of resolving the aspartame controversy once
58Sidney Shapiro, \Scientic Issues and the Function of Hearing Procedures: The FDA's
Public Board of Inquiry," Duke Law Journal, April, 1986, p.309. From an interview with
Robert Becker and Peter Sar, Counsel for Searle, Aspartame Hearing, in Washington, D.C.
(June 24, 1985)
5945 FR 69558
22and for all.
The panel Hayes inherited apprised him of the PBOI ndings, reviewed
the issues in controversy, summarized the arguments of both sides, and oered
advice based on its own conclusions. Three of the ve panelists tasked with
assessing aspartame's role in causing brain tumors concluded that the Searle
evidence did not suciently demonstrate aspartame's safety. Nevertheless, on
July 24, 1981, Commissioner Hays decided \the available data establish that
there is a reasonable certainty that human consumption of aspartame...will not
cause brain tumors."60 After a long, messy battle, Searle had nally gained
approval for its articial sweetener61.
What caused Commissioner Hays to contravene the conclusions of the
PBOI and his own scientic panel? The answer essentially boils down to the
frustrating, but inevitable conclusion that he simply interpreted the three rat
studies available on carcinegenicity dierently. As previously mentioned, in or-
der to gain FDA approval for a food additive, the 1958 Amendment to the
FD&C Act mandates that petitioners demonstrate \that the proposed use of
the food additive, under conditions of use specied in the regulation, will be
safe."62 Of course, a petition must also satisfy the infamous Delaney Clause
which stipulates that \no additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to
indicate cancer when ingested by man or animal."63 Views of certain aspar-
6046 FR 38285
61In 1983, Searle requested, and Congress granted, an extension on its aspartame patent, to
redress the nearly six years of marketing it lost due to the FDA stay of approval and subsequent
hearings and investigations. The extension was added as a Senate oor amendment to the
Orphan Drug Act of 1983. Pub.L. No. 97-414, x 11, 96 Stat. 2049, 2065-66 (1983). The
patent for aspartame expired on December 14, 1992.
6221 U.S.C. 348(c)(3)(A)
63Ibid.
23tame opponents notwithstanding, neither PBOI nor the three panelists argued
that the Delaney Clause applied to the aspartame controversy64: this was not
a case of a Commissioner approving a known carcinogen, but rather approving
a substance whose safety had not been demonstrated conclusively.
The crux of the controversy between the Commissioner on the one
hand, and the PBOI, majority of the advisory panel, and Olney on the other
hand, was a dierence in opinion about a causal relationship between exposure
to aspartame and onset of brain tumors in test rats.65 Evaluating the three brain
tumor studies done on laboratory rats, the PBOI had concluded that one was
\bizarre" because the control group had an unusually high incidence of tumors
and \puzzling" because it contained and inadequate number of test animals66.
Another study, according to the board, demonstrated the high mortality rate
among the young rats exposed to aspartame, which suggested a biologically sig-
nicant dose-eect.
Commissioner Hayes, however, contended that in the rst study the
number of test animals was experimentally sucient and that the board was
wrong to call the control group tumor rate \bizarre." He believed the board
was assuming a background rate (the rate at which tumors could be expected
to \normally" develop) that was too low. The actual background rate for this
species, he argued, is much higher and altogether consistent with that wit-
64For an example of a Delaney Clause controversy, see 45 FR 61476 (Cyclamate Decision)
65In the interest of brevity, various arguments and counterarguments regarding aspartame's
connection to brain damage, exacerbation of phenylketonuria, hyperphenylalanemia, focal
point brain lesions, and neuroendocrine disorders are excluded from this paper. In evaluating
the wisdom of the Commissioner's decision, I focus on the brain tumor debate because it was
the issue about which FDA and outside scientists were most divided. For discussion of these
issues, please see: 46 FR 38285, at 38287-38294.
66Final Decision, at 38295
24nessed in the Searle study. To bolster his argument, he pointed to a long-term
rat study conducted by the Japanese rm, Ajinomoto Co., Inc. which demon-
strated a similarly high spontaneous rate.67 Therefore, since the incidence of
tumors among the exposed and unexposed were similar, the study with the high
control group rate had demonstrated not an experimental oddity, but rather the
non-carcinogenicity of aspartame. As for the board's conclusion about carcino-
genicity causality among the young rats, Hayes argued that the board had made
factual errors in computing the age of death for some of the young rats. He also
contended that the board had erred in its statistical analysis of the dose-response
relationship and that no statistically signicant relationship in fact exists.68
In Hays' decision to permit aspartame into the food supply resides
the classic conundrum of FDA regulatory power: how much evidence is suf-
cient to keep a much-desired additive from entering the marketplace? FDA
decision-makers look to two main signposts as they navigate through a body
of evidence to arrive at conclusions about safety. First, in enacting the 1958
Amendment, Congress intended to place the burden of proving safety squarely
on the petitioner. Even if no evidence of lack of safety exists, a petition which
fails armatively to establish safety may be rejected pending further testing.69
Second, FDA assesses the meaning of the statutory language safety by applying
the legal standard of a \reasonable certainty in the minds of competent scien-
tists that the substance is not harmful under the intended conditions of use."70
67Searle and Ajinomoto Co., Inc. would enjoy a close professional friendship, opening up
an aspartame manufacturing plant together in Gravelines, France in 1991.
68Final Decision, at 38,299.
69Aspartame: Commissioner's Final Decision, July 24, 1981, 46 FR 38285, at 38286.
7021 C.F.R. 170.3(i) (1983)
25But what does \reasonable certainty" really mean, and how many com-
petent scientists does it take to meet such a standard? A General Accounting
Oce survey of 69 scientists nationwide who either personally researched as-
partame or had studied the research of colleagues revealed that ten believe
aspartame should be withdrawn from the market; twelve expressed major con-
cerns about its safety; and another twenty-six indicated they harbored some
concerns about aspartame in the food supply. Dr. Adrian Gross, Senior Science
Advisor at the Environmental Protection Agency and former Searle Task Force
investigator, feels that \at least one of [the aspartame rat] studies has estab-
lished beyond any reasonable doubt that aspartame is capable of inducing brain
tumors."71 In the aspartame controversy, so-called reasonable scientists were
divided; thus, to put it cynically, the reasonable scientist with the most power
made the ultimate determination. Whereas those unsatised with Searle's safety
evidence demanded more testing before they felt they could achieve this elusive
level of certainty, the Commissioner felt that the minimal evidentiary threshold
had been met, remarking, \if [you] wait for unanimity...nothing is ever going to
happen."72
Epidemiologist Debra Davis makes the following observation about ap-
plying the food additive legal standard in a gray area such as aspartame: \the
question of how much evidence is enough is not a scientic question. It's a pol-
icy question. That's what the FDA has to deal with." Some aspartame critics
worry, however, that when the FDA moves away from sheer scientic determina-
71Statement from Adrian Gross, included in the Congressional record, August, 1985.
72United States General Accounting Oce Report, 1987, p.57.
26tions it becomes vulnerable to political and industry inuence. Discovery of an
internal memorandum entitled \Food and Drug Sweetener Strategy" furthered
fueled these suspicion. The memo sets out tactics that Searle representatives
should use to gain FDA approval of aspartame: \the basic philosophy of our
approach...should be to try to get them to say \Yes," to rank the things that
we are going to ask for so we are putting rst those questions we would like
to get a \yes" to, even if we have to throw some in that have no signicance
to us, other than putting them in a yes saying habit." The memo continued,
\we must create an armative atmosphere in our dealing with them. It would
help if we can get them or get their people involved to do us any such favors."
Finally, it urged the Searle representatives to bring FDA decision-makers \into
a subconscious spirit of participation."73
Even if one discounts the Searle memorandum as an innocent company
pep-talk, there is legitimate concern that industries may be unduly inuencing
important FDA health decisions by conducting their own research tests. As
revealed by the Searle Task Force, industries with heavily vested interests may
be tempted to airbrush unattractive ndings here and there. Dr. Ralph G. Wal-
ton, professor of psychiatry at Northeastern Ohio's College of Medicine, recently
completed a survey of the 164 aspartame studies conducted over the past three
decades. Of the 90 independently funded studies, 83 \identied a problem,";
73Memorandum from Herbert Helling, G.D. Searle ocial, to other Searle ocials, regarding
\Food and Drug Sweetener Strategy," December 28, 1970, included in the U.S. Senate Joint
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
and the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the
Judiciary, \Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry," 1976, Part 2,
p.16-19.
27of the 74 studies funded by the aspartame industry, \every single one of them
attested to the safety of aspartame.74" What, however, would be a preferable
alternative testing regime? Surely it is nancially untenable to suggest the FDA
itself conduct all studies on new foods, drugs, and medical devices. Disallowing
industry tests on the grounds that they might be biased might result in deter-
ring research and development of new products, surely not a desirable outcome.
Occasionally auditing tests, as was done with Searle in the 1970's, and profes-
sional accountability might be the optimal checking mechanisms for the FDA.
As Monsanto's Dr. Weldon remarked, \no scientist is going to sacrice his or
her reputation just because of where the sponsor is or where the money came
from. That would be a very foolish thing to do."75
Those concerned about the vulnerability of FDA to industry courtship
also bemoan the \revolving door" between government agencies and private
industry. Some argue that this cross fertilization may taint the regulatory pro-
cess. Arthur Hull Hays, for example, left his post at FDA a few months after
approving aspartame's use in carbonated drinks to take job as senior scientic
consultant at Burson-Marsteller, Searle's public relations rm, earning $1000
a day76. In April of 1976, presented with the Searle Task Force's shocking
ndings, FDA Chief Counsel Richard Merrill informed Samuel Skinner, U.S.
Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, of an FDA investigation into
Searle's violations of the FD&C Act and the False Reports to the Government
74\How Sweet Is It?" p. 7.
75Ibid.
76Nutrition & Healing, November, 1995, p. 3.
28Act.77 The following January, Merrill formally requested Skinner to initiate
grand jury proceedings against Searle. In February, learning that President
Carter would not reappoint him, Skinner entered into employment negotiations
with the Chicago rm Sidley & Austin, who was representing Searle in its bat-
tle with the FDA. That summer, he left the U.S. Attorney's oce to become a
partner at Sidley. Skinner, who was later appointed Secretary of Transportation
and Chief of Sta by President Bush, insists that he had recused himself from
the grand jury investigation as soon as he contemplated going over the Sidley
and that his professional judgment as U.S. Attorney was in no way compro-
mised by his employment prospects78. Skinner turned the investigation over to
assistant U.S. Attorney William Conlon who convened a grand jury, but under
whose direction the statute of limitations for the aspartame charges ran out.
Fifteen months later, Conlon too left the U.S.A.O. to work for Sidley.79
Nevertheless, the decision to approve aspartame has survived extra-
agency scrutiny time and again. When Skinner, for example, presenetd himself
as President Bush's nominee for Secretary of Transportation in 1989, Senator
Howard Metzenbaum led an investigation into his contacts with Searle. Skin-
ner was exonerated, and received conrmation. The United States General
Accounting Oce (GAO), also at the behest of Metzenbaum, undertook a thor-
ough investigation of six former Health and Human Services and FDA employees
involved in the aspartame decision, including former Commissioners Hayes and
7718 U.S.C. 1001
78Senate Proceedings and Debates of the 101st Congress
79Gordon, Gregory, 1987. \NutraSweet: Question Swirl," UPI Investigative Report, Octo-
ber, 1987, reprinted in U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, \NutraSweet
Health and Safety Concerns," November 3, 1987, p.497.
29Sherwin Gardner.
The report, published in 1986, concluded that none of these ocials
had violated the federal postemployment statute, 18 U.S.C. 207, as amended by
the Ethics in Government Act of 197880. In 1987, GAO published the results of
another investigation into FDA's approval of aspartame. The report \did not
evaluate the scientic issues raised concerning the studies...nor did we deter-
mine aspartame's safety. We do not have such scientic expertise."81 GAO did
determine that FDA had followed the appropriate procedures and fullled its
legal duties in endorsing the sweetener.
A nal nod of approval emerged from the bench of the D.C. Court
of Appeals, where Judge Abner Mikva wrote a unanimous opinion endorsing
FDA's decision to grant both Searle's dry foods and carbonated beverage peti-
tions82. With the caveat that it was not purporting to reinterpret the scientic
data (\the judiciary is ill-equipped to conduct investigations and analyze facts
of the type involved in this case. Because of the agency's expertise and broad
discretion in ensuring the safety of food additives, we cannot substitute our
judgment for the agency's.83"), the court held that the agency had not abused
its discretion in approving aspartame for wet use on the basis of the studies
80\Six Former HHS Employees' Involvement in Aspartame's Approval," a brieng report
from the United States General Accounting Oce to the Honorable Howard Metzenbaum,
United States Senate, July, 1986.
81\Food Additive Approval Process Followed for Aspartame," United States General Ac-
counting Oce, June, 1987.
82Community Nutrition Institute v Young, 773 F.2d 1356 (1985). Court denied plaintis'
request for a temporary restraining order barring aspartame and held that the FDA did
not abuse its discretion in denying plaintis' request for a public hearing before approval
of aspartame in carbonated beverages, on the grounds that the objectors (including James
Tuner) had raised no new material evidence.
83Id., at 1363
30used to support the earlier approval for dry use.
Perhaps at the eye of the hurricane that is the aspartame controversy
there dwells a simple risk-benet analysis. The risks loom large but uncertain-
a possibility, as yet unquantied, that aspartame has contributed to 1,500 cases
of deadly brain cancer a year, a suspicion among some scientists that it induces
brain damage and seizures, and thousands of reported adverse reactions. Even
harder to assess are the benets. After all, with the exception of diabetics for
whom natural sugar is not an option, the benet to having a low-calorie al-
ternative to sugar are not comparable to the benets of a life-saving drug, for
example. Moreover, although Americans are consuming millions of pounds of
aspartame each year, there is no evidence that this habit contributes to weight
loss. In fact, Americans have never been more obese than we are today. How-
ever, availability of an articial is an integral part of the diet industry and
withdrawal of aspartame would force those unwilling to use sugar to consume
saccharin instead. This would be an undesirable displacement, as saccharin's
carcinogenic potential is probably greater than aspartame's. In the abscence of
clear proof of either saftey or hazard, allowing aspartame to enter the market
(and stay) is \a good example of one trade-o that has sometimes been made in
risk management: acceptance of a compound with no use experience, but little
animal evidence of toxicity, in preference to one with long use experience, but
some evidence of toxicity."84
Some who believe there is not enough scientic evidence to ban out-
84Michael A. Kamrin, Toxicology- A Primer on Toxicology Principles and Applications,
Lewis Publishers, Inc., 1988, p. 77.
31right the highly valued sweetener propose more informative labeling. In 1985,
former Senator Howard Metzenbaum introduced a bill entitled \the Aspartame
Safety Act," which would require manufacturer's to indicate on the label how
much aspartame is contained in the product. This would aid consumers and
their physicians to better understand the relationship between aspartame con-
sumption to adverse reactions. Most consumers do not know that the FDA has
set an Acceptable Daily Intake limit of 50 mg/kg for the sweetener. Including
the number of mgs of aspartame in food and beverages would allow individuals
to monitor their intake so they don't exceed this ADI and would impose a neg-
ligible burden on manufacturers.
But isn't the daily tolerance high enough that consumers needn't worry
about approaching it? As Metzenbaum explained, \sure, if you weigh 130
pounds you would have to drink 4 or 5 liters of diet soft drink to hit the
limit. But if you are a child that weighs 30 pounds, you hit that limit with
3 or 4 cans of diet soft drink. That's even without the gum, pudding, breakfast
cereal- all sweetened with aspartame."85 With the recent approval for use in
all foods, aspartame will emerge in even more products, from loaves of bread to
birthday cakes. Many consumers might not understand what a 50 mg/kg ADI
really means; however, with simultaneous national education eorts, a labeling
requirement would allow the consumer to conduct a private risk-benet analysis
of his own. With hysterical and confused consumers in one corner, diabetics and
the weight-conscious unwilling to surrender their delicious sweetener in another,
85Congressional Record, August 1985. Metzenbaum's proposal for the Aspartame Safety
Act was rejected by Congress.
32and science hovering uncertain and splintered in the middle, shifting the infor-
mation and responsibility to the individual might be the most pragmatic, and
conscionable, step FDA could take.
33